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FIGHTING BACK AGAINST THE TALIBAN: THE CASE
FOR RESTORING AFGHAN MEN AND WOMEN'S RIGHT
TO SELF-DETERMINATION
Since achieving independent statehood in the early twentieth
century,' Afghanistan has been enmeshed in turmoil. The people of
Afghanistan have not experienced any sustained period of political
stability, much less any form of democratic government.2 Over the
past several decades, changes in rule occurred frequently, and often
violently, with the 1990s being no exception? In 1992, the
Mujahideen resistance ousted the communist regime that was the
remainder of the 1979-89 Soviet occupation." Shortly after
Afghanistan's new President, Burhanuddin Rabbani, began his
reign that year,5 a new resistance movement appeared prepared for
battle near the Pakistani border.6 As it fought its way through
Afghanistan and into political power, this force became known to
the world as the Taliban.
Reports indicate that the Taliban movement originated in
fundamentalist Islamic schools, called madrassas, located in
Pakistan.7 The name Taliban stems from the word talib, meaning
religious student? Although the Taliban is comprised of men who
claim Afghan nationality, their origins are not pure: many are
1. See BARNETr R. RUBIN, THE FRAGMENTATION OF AFGHANISTAN: STATE FORMATION AND
COLLAPSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 19, 54 (1995). Although the origins of the Afghan
state date back to the eighteenth century, see id. at 45, Afghanistan did not permanently expel
colonial forces until 1919, see id. at 54.
2. See Amin Saikal, The Rabbani Government, 1992-1996, in FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN?
AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN 29, 29-30 (William Maley ed., 1998).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 29.
5. Id
6. See Anthony Davis, How the Taliban Became a Military Force, in FUNDAMENTALISM
REBORN? AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN 43, 43 (William Maley ed., 1998) (citing the
Taliban's official report that its militia originated in Kandahar, an Afghan province bordering
Pakistan). But see id. (stating that "the essential outlines of how the Taliban moved from the
madrassas of Pakistani Baluchistan [a region bordering Afghanistan] to the Presidential
Palace in Kabul are clear enough"); see also BARNETT R. RUBIN, THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN
AFGHANISTAN: FROM BUFFER STATE TO FAILED STATE 139 (1995) (stating that the Taliban
crossed the border into Afghanistan after organizing in Pakistan).
7. See Davis, supra note 6, at 43; Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan and the Taliban, in
FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN? AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN 72, 72-73 (William Maley ed.,
1998); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR
1999: AFGHANISTAN, at 1-2 (Sept. 9, 1999), at httpI/www.state.gov/www/global/human-.rights
/irf_rpt11999irfafghanis99.html [hereinafter REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM] (on file with author).
8. William Maley, Introduction to FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN? AFGHANISTAN AND THE
TALMAN 1, 1 (William Maley ed., 1998).
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Afghan refugees who grew up in camps in Pakistan,9 while others
are Pakistani members of the Pashtun tribe.10 Nevertheless, these
men now claim Afghanistan as their own, and seek to impose their
interpretation of Islamic law upon its people." Currently, the
Taliban controls about ninety percent of Afghanistan's territory,
including the capital region of Kabul.' It is still warring with
factions within Afghanistan, organized under President Rabbani's
ally Ahmad Shah Massoud,5 and it must use force and terror to
keep the Afghanistan population in line. 4 Since the Taliban
occupation began, many civilians have left or attempted to leave
Afghanistan,' and refugees still living in Pakistan and Iran because
of the 1979 Soviet invasion have refused to return while the Taliban
remains in power.'6
Nor has the world community welcomed the Taliban regime.
Only three countries-Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates-recognize the Taliban as a legitimate state.17 The United
Nations (UN) also has refused to recognize the Taliban government;
9. Rashid, supra note 7, at 72-73.
10. RUBIN, supra note 6, at 139. The Pashtun tribe is one of many ethnic groups that
occupy the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. See id. at 23.
11. See REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 1-2.
12. Anthony Loyd, The Last Stand Against the Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2001, § 6
(Magazine), at 44. As of last year, some reports indicated that the Taliban controlled ninety-
five percent of Afghanistan. Protest in Pakistan Takes Aim at Taliban; Police Use Force to
End Women's Rights Rally, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 11, 2000, at News 5, LEXIS, News Library,
Chicago Tribune File [hereinafter Protest in Pakistan); All Things Considered: Taliban Sends
Delegation to Washington to Lobby for International Recognition of the Taliban as
Afghanistan's Legitimate Government (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 29, 2000), LEXIS, News
Library, National Public Radio (NPR) File [hereinafter All Things Considered]; CBS Evening
News: Taliban in Afghanistan Claim Restrictions Placed on Women Are for the Women's Own
Protection (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 23, 2000), LEXIS, News Library, CBS News
Transcripts File [hereinafter CBS Evening News].
13. See Loyd, supra note 12; REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note
7, at 1-2.
14. See Maley, supra note 8, at 22; see also infra notes 68-112 and accompanying text
(describing the Taliban's oppression of the Afghan population, especially women).
15. See PETER MARSDEN, THE TALIBAN: WAR, RELIGION AND THE NEW ORDER IN
AFGHANISTAN 89 (1998); Loyd, supra note 12.
16. MARSDEN, supra note 15, at 89; Loyd, supra note 12. Refugees have specifically cited
the Taliban's oppression of women as a reason for their refusal to return. See MARSDEN,
supra note 15, at 89 (stating that."many refugees feel they cannot consider returning to
Afghanistan until their daughters can be sure of receiving an education and unless women
are allowed to work"); Pamela Constable, Tongue-Lashing the Taliban; Grandmotherly U.N.
Official Berates Afghans on Their Treatment of Women, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2000, at A22,
LEXIS, News Library, Washington Post File ("The Taliban's treatment of women has made
it an international pariah... and made some female refugees reluctant to return home.").
17. See Anastasia Telesetksy, In the Shadows and Behind the Veil: Women in Afghanistan
Under Taliban Rule, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 293, 300 (1998); All Things Considered,
supra note 12.
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Afghanistan's seat in the General Assembly is still occupied by
President Rabbani.'8 Perhaps the Taliban would have received a
warmer welcome if it were a democratically elected government that
respected human rights. It, however, is not. The Taliban's oppres-
sion of the Afghan people, particularly its systematic oppression of
women, has received vehement international criticism. 9 Prior to
the Taliban invasion, Afghan women enjoyed at least some of the
freedoms' ° internationally recognized as fundamental, such as the
right to work, the right to an education and freedom of movement.2'
Today they have none of these.22 This massive regression of
women's rights has been a dominant factor in the world commu-
nity's refusal to recognize the Taliban.' Even other Islamic
18. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Asia Overview: Afghanistan, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
WORLD REPORT 2000, at 166, 168 (1999); Saikal, supra note 2, at 42; Matthew Griffin, Note,
Accrediting Democracies: Does the Credentials Committee of the United Nations Promote
Democracy Through its Accreditation Process, and Should It?, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 725,
746-47 (2000); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1998, at 1 (Feb. 26, 1999), at http/Avww.state.govAvww/global/
human-rights/1998_hrp-reportafghanis.html [hereinafter REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES] (on file with author).
19. See, e.g., All Things Considered, supra note 12 (noting that most countries are
withholding recognition from the Taliban until it improves the status of women, ends its
support of terrorists and holds free elections); E.U. House Calls for Sanctions on Taliban,
HINDU, Dec. 9, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Hindu File (describing a resolution passed
unanimously by the European Parliament condemning the Taliban's support of terrorism and
discrimination against women, and the Parliament's encouragement of the UN and other
nations to follow suit); Bruce I. Friedland, Americans Aid Women Silenced by the Taliban,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 30,2000, at 43A, LEXIS, News Library, Dallas Morning News
File (discussing efforts by the Feminist Majority Foundation to raise money for illegal home
schools for girls in Afghanistan and to lobby the U.S. government to increase pressure on
Taliban supporters); Protest in Pakistan, supra note 12 (describing police suppression of a
rally against the Taliban by the Revolutionary Afghan Women's Association in Islambad,
Pakistan). The Feminist Majority Foundation has dedicated part of its website to activism
on behalf of Afghan women's rights. See Stop Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan, FEMINIST
MAJoITRY FOUND., at http'/www.feminist.org/afghan/facts.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2000)
[hereinafter Stop GenderApartheid]. The entertainment industry also has been instrumental
in calling for the protection of Afghan women. For example, a protest of women's oppression
in Afghanistan was the subject of a recent episode of the television program 7th Heaven. See
John Maynard, Highlights, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1999, at C7, 1999 WL 23307219.
20. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
21. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 71, arts. 13, 23, 26, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
22. See infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 414, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted) (condemning the Taliban's
activities, including its "abuses against women and children," and stating that the United
States would support efforts'to commence a political agenda "that would lead to the people
of Afghanistan determining their own destiny through a democratic process and free and fair
elections"); S. Con. Res. 150, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted) (same); S. Res. 68, 106th Cong. §
1 (1999) (stating that the U.S. should refuse to recognize any government in Afghanistan that
does not respect the rights of women); H.R. Res. 187, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999) (same); On the
Situation in Afghanistan, G.A. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 4051st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267
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governments, such as Iran, have condemned the Taliban's abuse of
women.
24
Although the Taliban leadership recently claimed that it has in
fact eased its restrictions on women,'S it has also defended its
actions as being in accordance with Islamic law and protested what
it views as foreign interference in its affairs.26  The people of
Afghanistan, however, could make the same claim of foreign
interference against the Taliban. Some observers have noted the
participation of other countries-specifically, Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia-in the Taliban's rise to power.27 Pakistan is not only
accused of funding and supplying the Taliban with weapons, but
also serving as its base of organization.' 8 Saudi Arabia has also
been accused of funding the Taliban. 9
Because of these circumstances, the remedy against the
institutionalized misogyny being perpetrated in Afghanistan may
lie in the international principle of self-determination. Interna-
(1999) (authorizing international sanctions against the Taliban while "[rleiterating its deep
concern over the continuing violations of international humanitarian law and of human
rights, particularly discrimination against women and girls").
24. See Matthew A. Levitt, The Taliban, Islam and Women's Rights in the Muslim World,
22 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 113,113 (1998).
25. See Constable, supra note 16; All Things Considered, supra note 12; CBS Evening
News, supra note 12. Some commentators find this hard to believe, especially when in
offering concessions to women's rights Taliban officials use analogies like, "[Miany Afghans
generally abhor dogs but treat them well if they are trained to obey commands." Constable,
supra note 16. As of September 2000, Amnesty International reported that "there's been no
improvement in the treatment of women and girls in Afghanistan." All Things Considered,
supra note 12.
26. See Nancy Hatch Dupree, Afghan Women Under the Taliban, in FUNDAMENTALISM
REBORNAFGHANISTANANDTHETALBAN 145,159 (William Maley ed., 1998); MARSDEN, supra
note 15, at 116.
27. See Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Conflict in-Afghanistan, in
FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN? AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN 117, 132-33 (William Maley ed.,
1998); see also infra notes 196-215, 224-27 and accompanying text (citing and describing
reports of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's contributions to the Taliban's military offensive). Some
observers have also implicated the United States in supporting the Taliban. See Ahady,
supra, at 132-33; Richard Mackenzie, The United States and the Taliban, in FUNDAMENTALISM
REBORN? AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN 90, 95-100 (William Maley ed., 1998); see also
Statement of Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on South Asia, WOMEN'S ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN (WAPHA) (Apr. 14, 1999), at http'J/www. angelfire.coml
on/wapha/dana.html (claiming that there has been "a covert policy by [the Clinton]
administration to support the Taliban movement's control of Afghanistan"). Although the
United States remained conspicuously aloof while the Taliban rose to power, see Mackenzie,
supra, at 95-97; Maley, supra note 8, at 2; Saikal, supra note 2, at 39-40, it has now
condemned the Taliban for its treatment of women, see Mackenzie, supra, at 90-91, 100-03;
sources cited supra note 23.
28. Davis, supra note 6, at 69-71.
29. Ahady, supra note 27, at 132; Rashid, supra note 7, at 76.
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tional law' has mandated nonintervention into the internal affairs
of states; this doctrine is rooted in the respect of each state's right
of self-determination.31 The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
emphasized this principle in Nicaragua v. United States,32 which
held that the United States' aid to the Contra Rebels constituted an
illegal intervention and use of force, and a violation of Nicaragua's
sovereignty. 3 This Note argues that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are
guilty of the same crime; furthermore, this Note argues that
condemnation of their actions by the world community would be an
opportunity to reconcile the tension between the self-determination
of states and the self-determination of people.' Given the Taliban's
external origins and its abuse of Afghan citizens, using interna-
tional mechanisms to restore the self-determination of Afghanistan
would emphasize that that principle should in fact be based upon
30. International law, as defined in the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
consists of "international conventions, [or treaties] . . . international custom,. . . general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations[, and] ... judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations . . ." Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, 1060.
31. See infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text. Although the meaning and scope of
self-determination is.not settled, see FERNANDO R. TES6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 130 (1998), this Note equates self-determination with the "right [of people to] freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development." Id. at 130-31 (quoting International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3); Robert McCorquodale, Self-
Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 INT' & COMP. L.Q. 857, 858 (1994) (same).
32. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
33. Id. at 146-47.
34. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 179-83 and
accompanying text (discussing one scholar's theory as to why this tension exists).
Traditionally, international law was indifferent to how state governments came to power.
THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES: LAW AND PRACTICE IN DEBATE AND
EVOLUrION 105 (1999); Fernando R. Tes6n, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MIcH.
J. INT'L L. 323, 331-32 (1996). Thus, international actors considered the right of self-
determination in "external" contexts-meaning that it applied to relationships between states
rather than to the relationship between a state and its people. See McCorquodale, supra note
31, at 863-64. Today, the right of self-determination is seen by many as "internal,"
particularly in light of growing international recognition of human rights. See id. at 865; see
also TES6N, supra note 31, at 129 ("The principle of respect for human rights is a genuine
principle, in the sense that it trumps majoritarian preferences, including claims of national
self-determination."). As stated by Professor Robert McCorquodale, "The Internal' aspect of
the right concerns the right of peoples within a State to choose their political status, the
extent of their political participation and the form of their government." McCorquodale, supra
note 31, at 864. The tension between the two conceptualizations of the right to self-
determination lies in the balance between international respect for state autonomy and
international interest in the protection of human rights within a sovereign state. See J.
Oloka-Onyango, Heretical Reflections on the Right to Self-Determination: Prospects and
Problems for a Democratic Global Future in the New Millenium, 15 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 151,
167-68 (1999).
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the self-determination of people through democratic process. Also,
condemning the Taliban's gender-based oppression and recognizing
the right of self-determination of women' would improve the status
of women's rights under international law.
This Note first discusses a brief history of Afghanistan, focusing
on women's rights. Secondly, it details the horrifying conditions in
which Afghan women now live. This Note then discusses interna-
tional law as it applies to the doctrine of nonintervention and the
right of self-determination, ultimately focusing on the landmark
Nicaragua case. Next, it examines Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's
actions through the lens of Nicaragua and argues that those
countries' support of the Taliban constitutes a violation of interna-
tional law. Finally, this Note contemplates the positive implications
of an international response, such as UN enforcement action, to this
violation for self-determination jurisprudence, especially the
incorporation of women's rights into its definition and practice.
AFGHANISTAN: PAST AND PRESENT
The country of Afghanistan does not fit the modem definition
of a nation-state.6 Afghanistan is comprised of several different
tribes, which differ in both ethnicity and religion. The various
Afghan governments established during the twentieth century failed
to achieve a cohesive Afghan nation, centralizing primarily in urban
areas where only a minority of the Afghan population resides. 5
Furthermore, foreign interests continuously have attempted to
manipulate Afghanistan for their own purposes.39 All of these
factors have influenced the numerous shifts in Afghan rule-and
the status of women's rights--over the past few decades.
35. Self-determination discourse has often excluded women from the definition of peoples,
focusing on, for example, classifications of "common historical tradition; racial or ethnic
identity; cultural homogeneity-, linguistic unity; religious or ideological affinity, territorial
connection; common economic life; and being a certain number." McCorquodale, supra note
31, at 866. Feminists have criticized this exclusion of women. See, e.g., Oloka-Onyango,
supra note 34, at 189-90 (stating that "[w] omen have a radical claim to entitlement" of self-
determination).
36. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 3-15.
37. Maley, supra note 8, at 4-5.
38. WILLIAM MALEY & FAZEL HAQ SAIKAL, INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY, POLITICAL
ORDER IN POST-COMMUNIST AFGHANISTAN 14 (1992).
39. See KAMAL MATINUDDIN, THE TALiBAN PHENOMENON: AFGHANISTAN 1994-1997, at
148-82 (1999). For example, Afghanistan's history in the twentieth century is rife with
struggles between communist and capitalist interests. For comprehensive discussions of the
history of American and Soviet influence in Afghanistan, see generally HAFIZuLLAH EMADI,
STATE, REVOLUTION, AND SUPERPOWERS IN AFGHANISTAN (1990); MALEY & SAIKAL, supra note
38; RUBIN, supra note 1.
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Afghanistan achieved its official independence in 1919 under
the leadership of King Amanullah. Seeking to build a modem
Afghanistan, King Amanullah implemented several progressive
reforms modeled after Western practices.4' Not only did he institute
dramatic changes in the economic structure of the state,42 he also
implemented major social reforms,' including women's liberation."
These reforms infuriated many tribal landowners and religious
leaders, who perceived them as contrary to the teachings of Islam.'
In 1929, King Amanullah was ousted in a military coup.' Shortly
thereafter, the rights women gained under Amanullah's reign were
eradicated by the new king.47 In 1930, King Nadir "declared the
inequality of men and women, closed down all girls schools through-
out the country, and re-invoked the veil for women. "4
After King Nadir was assassinated in 1933, the succeeding
government continued Afghanistan's modernization.49 Women's
emancipation, however, did not resume again until the 1950s.50 In
1959, Premier Daoud declared that wearing the veil was optional for
women." As with previous reforms involving women's legal status,
this declaration outraged conservative Islamic leaders. 2 This time,
however, "Premier Daoud used the military to crush [his] opposition
to his 'women's movement' and to teach a lesson to opposition forces
elsewhere."' After Daoud's reign, women's freedom in urban areas
remained fairly constant. Women worked outside the home in
numbers comparable to men." Women enjoyed equal opportunity
40. EMADI, supra note 39, at 1; RUBIN, supra note 1, at 54.
41. EMADI, supra note 39, at 3-4; RUBIN, supra note 1, at 55-56.
42. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 55.
43. EMADI, supra note 39, at 4; RUBIN, supra note 1, at 55-56. Some of these social
reforms included separation of church and state, compulsory education for children, and
monogamy in marriage. See EMADI, supra note 39, at 4.
44. EMADI, supra note 39, at 4; RUBIN, supra note 1, at 56; Telesetsky, supra note 17, at
295.
45. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 57.
46. EMADI, supra note 39, at 5; RUBIN, supra note 1, at 57.
47. See EMADI, supra note 39, at 8.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 8-9.
50. See id. at 36-37.
51. See id. at 37; RUBIN, supra note 1, at 71-72.
52. EMADI, supra note 39, at 37.
53. Id. According to Emadi, "Tanks and aircraft fighters raided villages for several days.
As a result more than 600 people, including religious and tribal leaders, were arrested and
executed in the capital penitentiaries." Id. But see RUBIN, supra note 1, 71-72 (stating that
even though Daoud "confronted both the tribes and the religious establishment, using women
as symbols," he suppressed protests "firmly but without violence").
54. Prior to Taliban control, "70% of school teachers [including 60% of those at Kabul
University], 50% of civilian government workers, and 40% of doctors in Kabul were women."
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in education: many schools were co-educational and women made
up fifty percent of the students at Kabul University. Women even
participated in the government as both ministers and members of
parliament in certain administrations.56
In contrast to urban areas, the tribal, patriarchal family
structure in rural areas has greatly limited women's freedom
throughout Afghanistan's history."7 Although sexist practices vary
from tribe to tribe, the general rule is that the man is the head of
household.' Male domination manifests itself in veiling, as well as
the "segregation and seclusion of women,"59 a practice called
purdah.' Women are commodified through arranged marriages6'
and polygamy is common.62 Adultery and "sexual misconduct" by
women are considered "a political threat to the honor and strength
of a family" and are punishable by death or exile.' Yet, despite the
fact that rural Afghan women have not experienced the same
liberation as their urban counterparts," they have not accepted
gender-based oppression passively.' As described by one source:
Women contest male domination through "ordinary forms of
resistance." They claim, for example, that, despite appearances,
they actually wield much power; they create a distinct women's
culture...; they have frequent discussions of the suffering that
is the lot of woman; and... some commit sexual indiscretions,
which others help conceal. One element of women's self-image
in Afghanistan, at least among the Pashtuns, is the belief that
men, for all their posturing, are weaker than women, and that
women could defend namus" at least as well if they had the
chance-and the guns.67
Stop Gender Apartheid, supra note 19. Women also worked in such traditionally male
occupations as the army and police force. EMADI, supra note 39, at 101.
55. Stop Gender Apartheid, supra note 19.
56. EMADI, supra note 39, at 101.
57. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 41.
58. Id. at 23-24.
59. Id. at 24.
60. Dupree, supra note 26, at 153.
61. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 23-24.
62. Id. at 24.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 79-80.
65. Id. at 41.
66. As inferred from Rubin's definition of namus, "zan, zar, zamin (woman, gold, land),"
namus essentially means property. Id. at 24.
67. Id. at 41.
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Unfortunately, "ordinary forms of resistance" have not effected
gender equality for rural Afghan women. Indeed, if they did have
the guns, their forms of resistance might be armed rather than
ordinary.
The Taliban used this strategy of armed force to take control of
Afghanistan.' Despite its dominance over the Afghan territory and
population, however, the Taliban has not been widely recognized as
the official government of Afghanistan69-primarily because of its
barbaric legal system and abuse of human rights.70 The Taliban
regime has no constitution7 ' and its judiciary lacks any procedural
guarantees of due process, fair trials or humane punishment.72 Its
Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice
(PVSV) acts as both police officer andjudge, patrolling the streets
to enforce morality among the Afghan populace.73 The PVSV
scrutinizes, among other things, women's dress and the length of
men's beards, as well as civilians' loyalty to the Taliban's brand of
Islam.7' Those found in violation of these codes are punished
immediately, often through beatings.7"
Trials, when they are held, are "summary" at best and without
appeal.76 Punishments are conducted publicly." Convicted murder-
ers and rapists are executed, sometimes by the family members of
the victim.78 Those convicted of adultery-women, according to
most reports 79-are stoned to death or flogged;' ° "Itihose found
guilty of homosexual acts [are] crushed by having walls toppled over
them."8 Convicted thieves have been subjected to hand and foot
68. Maley, supra note 8, at 1-2.
69. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; Telesetsky, supra note 17, at 299.
71. REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 1.
72. See REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 5.
73. Id.
74. Id. For example, officers of the PVSV reportedly have required civilians to recite
Islamic prayers. Id. at 7.
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 14 ("Women accused
of adultery offenses are ... subjected to violence. At least one accused adulteress was
sentenced to 100 lashes; her sentence was carried out publicly."); see also Stop Gender
Apartheid, supra note 19 (stating that '[a] woman caught trying to flee Afghanistan with a
man not related to her was stoned to death for adultery").
80. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 5.
81. Id.
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amputations, 2 and one woman had the end of her thumb cut off for
wearing nail polish.'
Women in particular have been targeted by the Taliban. The
regulation of women's appearance is perhaps the most visible form
of Taliban oppression." Women must be covered completely-from
head to toe-while in public." Besides stigmatizing women as
inferior," this requirement hampers the mobility of many Afghan
women. Specifically, the garment that women must wear, the
burqa, is relatively expensive.87 Not all women can afford a burqa;'
therefore, more than one woman may be forced to share a single
burqa or go without entirely. 9 Some disabled women or women
requiring prosthetic devices, both fairly common tragedies in
Afghanistan because of its history of conflict and the prevalence of
land mines,' cannot wear a burqa correctly.91 Without burqas,
women cannot leave their homes without risking detention or
violence from the PVSV.' One "elderly woman was brutally beaten
with a metal cable until her leg was broken because her ankle was
accidentally showing from underneath her burqa."' Another female
refugee witnessed the attempted shooting of a woman for the same
infraction.'
82. Id.
83. Telesetsky, supra note 17, at 294.
84. See id.; see also REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 5.
85. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 5.
86. The veiling and covering of women has its origins in the Islamic religion. See id. This
practice serves the function of prohibiting males from looking at women, which in turn
prevents "moral corruption" and "sexual anarchy." Dupree, supra note 26, at 151. The
practice of covering has also been interpreted as keeping women invisible in the public area,
which is seen as reserved for males. See Telesetsky, supra note 17, at 296. In Taliban-
controlled areas of Afghanistan, the prohibition against women wearing shoes that make
noise when they walk solidifies this invisibility. See REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 6.
87. See Telesetsky, supra note 17, at 296.
88. See REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 6.
89. See Telesetsky, supra note 17, at 296.
90. For statistics on the occurrence of land mines in Afghanistan, see REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 18, at 9.
91. See REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 5-6.
92. Id.
In a 1998 survey, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) found that 22 percent of
the female respondents surveyed reported being detained and abused by the
Taliban; of these incidents, 72 percent were related to alleged infractions of the
Taliban's dress code for women. Most of these incidents reportedly resulted in
detentions that lasted 1 hour or less, but 84 percent also resulted in public
beatings and 2 percent resulted in torture.
Id.
93. Stop Gender Apartheid, supra note 19.
94. See Telesetsky, supra note 17, at 303.
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This restrictive physical covering is only one example of
women's erasure from public life. When the Taliban took control of
Kabul in September 1996, it immediately issued orders that women
could no longer work outside the home' or seek an education.96 Nor
can women leave their homes without a male relative,' and men
accompanying women are subject to interrogation by the PVSV to
verify their identities.' As in Saudi Arabia," women in Taliban-
controlled areas of Afghanistan are forbidden to drive.' ° Moreover,
public transportation systems are segregated by gender.'"' The
windows of women's buses must be covered, and only boys under the
age of fifteen may be employed to collect women's fares to prevent
interaction between women and the male bus drivers, who are
further separated from the female passengers by a curtain.' The
windows of houses in which women live must be painted over so
that strangers cannot see the women inside.'
The effect of these prohibitions is not merely superficial; the
damage the Taliban has caused is very real. Because women cannot
work in the public sphere, many women-and widows in particu-
lar-are living in poverty and hunger.'' Gender segregation in
medical services has resulted in a dramatic decrease in women's
health.0 5 Moreover, the Taliban has restricted humanitarian aid to
95. See REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 6.
96. See id. at 2-3. The Taliban forbids the schooling of female children over the age of
eight. See id. at 3. Although Taliban leaders promise that they will allow the education of
Afghan girls in the future, they have also stated that such education would be confined to the
Koran. See id.
97. See id.
98. CBS Evening News, supra note 12; Friedland, supra note 19; Protest in Pakistan,
supra note 12:
99. See Mai Yamani, Some Observations on Women in Saudi Arabia, in FEMINISM &
ISLAM: LEGALAND LITERARY PERSPEcTIvES 263,272 (Mai Yamani ed., 1996). In Saudi Arabia,
this prohibition on women's driving, while customary, was not made law until 1990, after
forty-seven Saudi women engaged in a "driving demonstration" in the country's capital. Id.
The timing of this protest was particularly notable in that it occurred during the Gulf War,
when much of the world's attention was on the Middle East. Id.
100. See REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 6.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Another source describes the situation as follows:
For the first time in its history, beggars roam the streets of Kabul or huddle
outside relief agencies. A high proportion are children and women, many of
whom are widows or those responsible for disabled men unable to work. A
January 1997 survey by ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross]'
recorded the presence of 50,000 widows, each with an average of 7-9 children.
Dupree, supra note 26, at 155.
105. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 7. This is a result
of many factors. First, women comprised a significant percentage of Kabul's medical
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Afghan women.' In 1997, the Taliban decreed that international
humanitarian aid "be provided to women through their close male
relatives rather than directly."' °7 This rule places women at the
mercy of their male relatives, if they are lucky enough to have them.
Furthermore, the rule that women be accompanied by a male
relative was extended to Muslim female UN and non-governmental
organization (NGO) workers in 1998.' 8  Because of this rule,
humanitarian relief in Afghanistan has been reduced drastically.'
In addition to the state-sanctioned physical and psychic violence
against women discussed above, crimes of murder, rape, kidnapping
and forced marriage have flourished under the Taliban regime. **0
Although some of this violence has been attributed to other factions,
many reports cite members of the Taliban as perpetrators."'
Despite the Taliban's claim that its gender stratification policies
protect Afghan women, especially from sexual assault,"2 this
rhetoric evidently has not deterred its soldiers from raping and
kidnapping.
The Taliban's repression of women can be described as nothing
short of war, and yet, the Taliban defends its actions as within its
authority as Afghanistan's government and as followers of Islam."
It is clear, however, that the Taliban has undermined the Afghan
people's right of self-determination through the use of force. In
recent years, the international community has grown less tolerant
of such violence, following the development of the concept that state
sovereignty and self-determination are predicated upon the practice
profession, see supra note 53, yet were fired when the Taliban took over the city. REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 6. Since then, under international
pressure, the Taliban has allowed some female doctors and nurses to practice under restricted
conditions. Id. Male doctors cannot see female patients without the presence of a male
relative, and even then they are forbidden to touch them. Id. at 7. As characterized by the
United States Department of State, this prohibition "drastically limits the possibility of any
meaningful treatment." Id. Furthermore, hospitals have been segregated by gender,
although not equally: in 1997, the Taliban banned women from all hospitals in Kabul except
for one partially-constructed facility. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Country Reports: Afghanistan, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY
OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: 1999-2000, at 39,41 (Adrian Karatnyckyed., 2000)
[hereinafter Country Reports: Afghanistan]; Jan Goodwin, I Could Have Been Executed,
GLAMOUR, May 2000, at 286, 287-88, 300; REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note
18, at 14.
111. See sources cited supra note 110.
112. See Dupree, supra note 26, at 149-51; CBS Evening News, supra note 12.
113. See Dupree, supra note 26, at 159.
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of democracy and respect of human rights.'14 Furthermore, women's
rights advocates have actively sought to bring gender equality into
this conceptualization, demanding the recognition of women's right
to self-determination and the incorporation of that right into
domestic and international law.1 5
Despite numerous declarations and conventions declaring the
equality of men and women, such as the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,"6 the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Violence Against Women," 7 and the UN
Charter itself,"' social systems that subjugate women continue to
exist. Women's rights have been unenforced by the world commu-
nity, presumably because those in power have an interest in
maintaining gender inequality domestically." 9  One crime that
usually receives an active response, however, is the use of force by
one state against another.' Ironically, it is the principle of self-
determination that underlies the prohibition of the use of force
between states: the use of force against one state by another
constitutes a violation of the former state's sovereignty and self-
determination under international law.' 21
ILLEGAL INTERVENTION AND SELF-DETERMINATION
The main purpose of establishing the United Nations was to
create an international system that would lead to and maintain
world peace.22 After World War II, the founders of the UN sought
114. See GRANT, supra note 34, at 92,94; Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State
and Its Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 19-21 (1997).
115. See, e.g., Oloka-Onyango, supra note 34, at 157-58 (recognizing "the need to 'degender'
self-determination's predominant male focus, by bringing women directly into the discussion
on the subject and by firmly ensconcing feminist perspectives into the conceptualization of
statehood and self-determination"); Schachter, supra note 114, at 13 ("[Tlhe movement for
women's rights 11 has spread widely and deeply and, in many ways, challenges the authority
of the state.").
116. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981). This Convention was signed but
not ratified by Afghanistan and the United States. See BURNS H. WESTON ETAL., SUPPLEMENT
OF BASIC DOCUMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 1301 (3d ed. 1997). It was
ratified with qualification by Pakistan and neither signed nor ratified by Saudi Arabia. Id.
at 1301-02.
117. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1994).
118. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
119. See Oloka-Onyango, supra note 34, at 185-86.
120. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: The
Continuing Importance of State Autonomy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 473, 473 (1997).
121. See infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
122. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
2001]
536 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:523
to avoid another war and the horrors it produced.'" Besides
establishing a forum for international cooperation, m' the UN created
a charter outlining international principles,'" established a court
for the adjudication of disputes between states' and designated a
peacekeeping force to intervene in precarious situations.2 '
One principle contained in the UN Charter is the prohibition
against the use of force by one nation against another.'" Article 2
states that "[aill Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."' Further
pronouncements against "acts of aggression" are found in Articles
1(1) and 39, which state the willingness of the United Nations to
intervene against such aggression.'30 The UN also elaborated on
the meaning of aggression in its Resolution on the Definition of
Aggression.' 3' Article 1 of the resolution states that "[a]ggression is
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
123. See id. at pmbl.
124. See id. at art. 35. It is important to note that the UN General Assembly is not a
legislative body; therefore, it does not create international law. STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL,
JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 499-501 (1994); see also supra note 30 (identifying sources of
international law). It would be wrong, however, to assume that the recommendations of the
UN General Assembly do not influence international law. As stated by Stephen Schwebel,
former Judge of the International Court of Justice, "General Assembly resolutions may
authoritatively find what the law is, and such resolutions, declaratory of international law,
can have an important effect in crystallizing and even progressively developing international
law." SCHWEBEL, supra, at 502.
125. U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
126. Id. at art. 7; see Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 1, 59
Stat. 1031, 1055.
127. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41-42. Article 39 of the Charter authorizes the Security
Council to determine when intervention by the UN peacekeeping force may be warranted. Id.
at art. 39. "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security." Id. Should the Security Council determine that
international peace or security is threatened by a state's actions, it may decide what measures
to employ to effectuate its decision to intervene. Id. The initial measures available are those
"not involving the use of armed force," such as diplomatic severance and economic sanctions,
id. at art. 41; however, "[sihould the Security council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action...
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." Id. at art. 42.
"Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations." Id.
128. See id. at art. 2.
129. Id. at art. 1, para. 4.
130. Id. at art. 1, para. 1; id. at. art. 39.
131. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
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integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set
out in this Definition."3 2 Article 3 sets forth those acts which
constitute acts of aggression. They include armed invasion by forces
of one state against the territory of another," s "military occupation
... resulting from such invasion,"' the use of weapons by one state
against another' and the attack by one state's armed forces against
the armed forces of another.'s Also included as an act of aggression
is "[tihe sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed
above, or its substantial involvement therein."137
The prohibition against aggression is grounded in respect of
state sovereignty and the right of self-determination, in addition to
the UN's ultimate goal of maintaining peace.' Although originally
interpreted to apply only to states, 39 international observers have'
recognized that the principle of self-determination should apply to
people as well." This modern interpretation is supported by
definitions of self-determination provided in the UN Charter and
other international declarations. The UN Charter includes as one
of its purposes the development of "friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determina-
tion of peoples. .... "'I This idea is repeated in Article 55, which
states that "the United Nations shall promote.., universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.""2 The
broadest definition of self-determination, however, is found in the
132. Id. at art. 1.
133. Id. at art. 3, para. (a).
134. Id.
135. Id. at art. 3, para. (b).
136. Id. at art. 3, para. (d).
137. Id. at art. 3, para. (g).
138. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
139. See generally Oloka-Onyango, supra note 34 (describing historical perceptions of the
concept of self-determination and calling for its expansion).
140. See TESON, supra note 31, at 131; McCorquodale, supra note 31, at 858-59; see also
Douglas Lee Donoho, Evolution or Expediency: The United Nations Response to the Disruption
of Democracy, 29 CORNELL IN'rL L.J. 329, 367-68 (1996) ("Democracy, political participation
rights and the concept of internal self-determination have gained increased stature in
international law in recent years. International organizations, bureaucrats and states now
commonly link the maintenance of peaceful international relations to the existence of
democratic regimes and to the protection of human rights.").
141. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
142. Id. at art. 55, para (c).
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Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States,' which provides:
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State,
the free association or integration with an independent State or
the emergence into any other political status freely determined
by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people.
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action
that deprives peoples... of their right to self-determination and
freedom and independence. 1"
The Declaration further states, "In their actions against and
resistance to such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their
right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and
receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations."15
The landmark international law case finding an illegal
intervention and use of force is the Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America)." In that case, Nicaragua brought suit
against the United States before the International Court of Justice,
alleging that the United States engaged in acts of aggression
against Nicaragua and thereby violated its sovereignty. 1 7 These
acts of aggression included laying mines in Nicaraguan waters,"48
invading Nicaraguan airspace with American military planes'49 and
aiding the Contra Rebels in the Nicaraguan civil war.' ° Because
the United States contested the ICJ's jurisdiction to adjudicate the
dispute, it withdrew from the proceedings after the ICJ held that
such jurisdiction did exist." Relying upon Nicaragua's version of
the facts, 52 the court found that the United States had engaged in
these acts of aggression and that its aid to the Contras constituted
a violation of Nicaragua's sovereignty.'
143. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
144. Id. at 121.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
147. Id. at 18-19.
148. Id. at 18-19, 46-48.
149. Id. at 18-19, 51-53.
150. Id. at 18-19, 21-22, 53-62.
151. Id. at 22-23.
152. Id. at 25.
153. Id. at 48, 52-53, 61-62.
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The ICJ, however, ruled against Nicaragua's assertions that the
United States had "'created' the contra force in Nicaragua,"1 4 and
that the United States was liable for the human rights violations
committed by the Contra Rebels, such as murder, rape and kidnap-
ping.155 Despite its finding that the United States had financed the
Contras by way of military supplies and humanitarian aid,156 as well
as helped to devise their military strategy,157 the existence of civil
strife in Nicaragua prior to this assistance15 and the eventual
autonomy of the Contrasl"9 barred the court from imputing responsi-
bility for all Contra actions to the United States.' With regard to
the United States' responsibility for human rights violations
committed by the Contras, the court offered the following analysis:
All the forms of United States participation mentioned above,
and even the general control by the [United States] over a force
with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves
mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed
or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights
and humanitarian law alleged by [Nicaragua]. Such acts could
well be committed by members of the contras without the control
of the United States. For conduct to give rise to legal responsi-
bility of the United States, it would in principle have to be
proved that that State had effective control of the military or
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged
violations were committed.161
What the court did find was that the United States had
"encouraged" the Contra Rebels to commit anti-humanitarian acts
154. Id. at 61.
155. Id. at 63-65.
156. Id. at 58. The court found evidence of this assistance in the United States
Government's budget from 1981 forward. See id. Witness testimony revealed that, in
addition to providing weapons, ammunition, communications equipment and aircraft, the CIA
gave salaries to Contra leaders. See id. at 58-59. The CIA provided training in "guerilla
warfare, sabotage, demolitions, and in the use of a variety of weapons, including assault rifles,
machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and explosives,'... [and] supplied the [Contras]
with intelligence, particularly as to Nicaraguan troop movements, derived from radio and
telephonic interception, code-breaking, and surveillance by aircraft and satellites." Id. at 59.
157. Id. at 60-61.
158. Id. at 53.
159. Id. at 62. Noting that Contra activity continued after the United States ceased to
authorize funding for the Contras' military purposes in 1984, the ICJ found that "the evidence
available to the Court indicates that the various forms of assistance provided to the contras
by the United States have been crucial to the pursuit of their activities, but is insufficient to
demonstrate their complete dependence on United States aid." Id.
160. Id. at 64.
161. Id. at 64-65.
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through the production and dissemination of a manual on psycho-
logical warfare. 2 This manual, which was allegedly written "by 'a
low-level contract employee' of the CIA," contained such directives
as hiring professional criminals for specific "jobs," "neutralizing"
state officials and inciting violence against demonstrators in order
to create martyrs. 164 Despite this evidence of "encouragement," and
ample evidence of military support, the ICJ held that there was not
enough evidence to find the United States culpable for the Contras'
alleged human rights violations.'
Legal scholars have criticized the ICJ's failure to hold the
United States liable for aiding and abetting the Contras' human
rights abuses. For example, Professor Francis Boyle agreed with
the legal standard articulated by the ICJ that the accused party
must exercise "operational control" over those who commit human
rights abuses; however, he disagreed with the ICJ's holding that it
had insufficient evidence to conclude that the United States had
such control over the Contras.'6 Specifically, he asserted that the
Contras' war "was under the command of a 'unified general
staff'" 67-- composed of high-ranking officials of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Council, the State
Department and the Department of Defense-and that this staff
was fully aware of the atrocities being committed by the Contras
against Nicaragua's civilian population.' Moreover, Professor
Boyle himself observed in Nicaragua that "the deliberate infliction
of barbarous outrages upon the civilian population of Nicaragua...
[was] the operational rationale behind the contras' terror war."'6
Indeed, the facts cited in the Nicaragua decision discussing the
CIA's written instructions on how to commit psychological warfare
confirm the United States' interest in the commission of these
outrages. 7 '
Others have argued that the ICJ's standard for finding control
was too high. Professors Mark Gibney, Katarina Tomasevsky and
Jens Vedsted-Hansen argued in a recent article that "one of the
162. Id. at 66.
163. Id. at 67.
164. Id. at 66. The manual itself was entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla
Warfare (English translation] and contained chapters such as Implicit and Explicit Terror and
Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects. See id. at 65-66.
165. Id. at 148.
166. Francis A. Boyle, Determining U.S. Responsibility for Contra Operations under
International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 86, 86 (1987).
167. Id. at 88 (quoting CHRISTOPHER DICKEY, WITH THE CONTRAS 153 (1985)).
168. See id at 87-88.
169. Id. at 88.
170. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
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biggest problems with [the ICJ's] result is that 'control' is treated as
an either-or proposition. In reality, there will be varying degrees of
control-and international human rights law should reflect this
fact."' To explain their argument, they presented the following
illustration:
[SIupplying another country with foreign aid which is then used
by this other country to purchase weapons of torture on the
world market is qualitatively different than actually carrying
out the torture. That much is obvious. But a country that
supplies weapons of torture to another state, knowing full well
that the recipient is using this assistance to commit torture, is
doing something: it is actually facilitating the pernicious
practice. . . .The ICJ decision in Nicaragua is especially
objectionable because the U.S. Government's actions in support-
ing the contras was ultimately treated under the law as being
indistinguishable from countries that had absolutely no connec-
tion with the contras whatsoever.... "1 2
Gibney, Tomasevsky and Vedsted-Hansen also noted that American
law requires "far less 'control'" to find foreign states liable for
attacks against American citizens. 73 Professor Boyle echoed this
point, arguing that under the United States' own interpretation of
the law of war, the knowledge by some United States' officials of the
human rights abuses committed by the Contras would make them
vicariously responsible for the latter's war crimes.' 74
Professor Fernando Tes6n is another legal scholar who has
offered substantial criticism of Nicaragua v. United States, although
from a different angle. He argued that the ICJ incorrectly and
unnecessarily assessed the enforcement of human rights as a
domestic rather than international issue.'75 The ICJ presented this
holding not in response to Nicaragua's argument that the United
States be held responsible for the Contras' violations of human
rights, but rather the United States' argument that its intervention
171. Mark Gibney et al., Transnational State Responsibility for Violations of Human
Rights, 12 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 267, 285-86 (1999).
172. Id. at 287 (footnote omitted).
173. Id. at 286 n.77 (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. II 1996) (holding foreign states responsible for crimes committed
by non-state actors who are materially supported by that state); Flatow v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that Iran financially supported the terrorist
group accused of committing a suicide bomb attack that killed a United States citizen in
Israel)).
174. Boyle, supra note 166, at 88-90.
175. See Fernando R. Tes6n, Le Peuple, c'est moi! The World Court and Human Rights, 81
AM. J. INT% L. 173, 173-74 (1987).
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was based in part upon Nicaragua's violations of human rights. 6
Essentially, the ICJ stated that the protection of human rights must
be enacted through treaties and, therefore, is not encompassed in
customary international law.' In articulating and defending the
principles of nonintervention and self-determination of states, the
ICJ excluded the rights of people who comprise states. 7
Professor Tes6n described the philosophical rationale behind
this holding as the Hegelian Myth.179 The fallacy of the Hegelian
Myth lies in its "assumption ... that states are somehow moral
agents that are free and able to choose, just as individuals are free
and able to make moral choices.""s° By personifying states as moral
actors, deserving of freedom and autonomy, international law
ascribes the power to states that should belong to people.' 8'
According to Tes6n, this confusion of the people and their govern-
ment in legal discourse has undermined human rights:. 2
[Tihe assertion of a "fundamental right" of the state to "choose
its political system" is no more than a defense of the legitimacy
of any use of political power. The transmutation of words has
now become a rationalization for oppression; the "freedom"
("independence," "sovereignty," "equal liberty") of the state
means carte blanche for tyrants to exercise arbitrary power and
deny individual freedom .... 
The ICJ's protective language toward state sovereignty in Nicara-
gua, and lack thereof toward human rights, embodied the Hegelian
myth.' In rushing to protect the right of states to self-determina-
tion, the ICJ failed to recognize people's right to self-determination.
In doing so, the ICJ ignored the massive wave of human rights
protection that has developed in international law since 1945.11
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the fact that the ICJ
formulated a standard for "recogniz[ing] the possibility of holding
176. Id.
177. See id. (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,130-
31, 134 (June 27)).
178. Id. at 174-75.
179. See id. at 181.
180. Id
181. See id. at 181-82.
182. See id. at 182.
183. Id. Tes6n is quoting the ICJ's statement that "[elvery State possesses a fundamental
right to choose and implement its own political, economic and social systems." Id. at 173
(quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 130-31).
184. See id. at 181.
185. Id. at 175.
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one state responsible for supporting and assisting another in
committing violations of international law (including human rights
violations)"' is promising for the enforcement of human rights.
Moreover, since the Nicaragua decision was handed down fourteen
years ago, the world community has progressively shown less
tolerance for human rights abuses. 7 The United Nations has
demonstrated a willingness to take forcible and non-forcible
enforcement actions against states in order to end human rights
violations and remedy disruptions of democracy.' If this trend
continues, a people's right to self-determination may come to
fruition, as reflected in the words of the UN Charter and other
international treaties, and as articulated by theorists like Professor
Tes6n. Recognizing the Taliban's takeover as a violation of both the
self-determination of Afghanistan as a state and--especially in light
of its flagrant human rights abuses-the self-determination of the
Afghan people, could cement the inseparability of these variations
on the same principle.
THE CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA
The actual origins of the Taliban are shrouded in mystery.' 9
The official historians of the Taliban tell a tale of a small force
arising from a madrassa within Afghanistan, reacting in outrage
against highway taxation and rape perpetrated by the
Mujahideen.' Their success, Taliban sympathizers claim, is owed
to religious fervor and the welcoming of the Afghan people." Other
sources tell a different story: that the Taliban formed in the
madrassas of Pakistan,' and that its success came with the aid of
that country and others.' s Without that aid, the Taliban never
would have achieved so much power in so little time.
194
186. Gibney et al., supra note 171, at 284.
187. Id. at 295.
188. See Tesdn, supra note 34, at 343-70 (discussing UN intervention in Iraq, Somalia,
Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia during the 1990s).
189. See Davis, supra note 6, at 43.
190. See id.; see also MATINUDDIN, supra note 39, at 22-26 (citing among the list of outrages
random killings, drug-trafficking and homosexuality, including one incidence of gay
marriage).
191. See Davis, supra note 6, at 43, 55.
192. See RUBIN, supra note 6, at 139; Davis, supra note 6, at 43; Rashid, supra note 7, at
72-74.
193. See infra notes 196-215, 224-27 and accompanying text.
194. Davis, supra note 6, at 48-49.
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Reports pointing toward Pakistan's involvement in the
Taliban's rise to power are numerous.1" The Taliban's first large-
scale military attack, in Afghanistan's frontier region of Spin
Boldak, was allegedly accompanied "by artillery fire from across the
border" in Pakistan." Shortly thereafter, the Taliban claimed to
have seized what was known as the Spin Boldak or Pasha arms
dump,"9 a large cache of weapons and ammunition brought over
from Pakistan in 1991."8 Some sources argue that this seizure
explained how the Taliban became equipped enough to conquer so
much territory so quickly;199 others assert that this explanation is
just a ruse to cover-up arms supplies from foreign allies."'
According to one rumor, the Pasha dump actually contained little or
nothing, having been looted prior to the Taliban's arrival."'
Another report asserts that the dump was still intact, but that the
Pakistan troops guarding it "were ordered to walk away when the
Taliban arrived."' In any case, witnesses reported seeing Taliban
soldiers with brand new weapons prior to its next big operation-the
capture of the Afghan region of Kandahar:
Foreign aid officials leaving the city as or shortly before fighting
broke out reported to one Western correspondent seeing several
hundred Taliban reinforcements who had crossed the border
grouped on the Spin Boldak-Kandahar road. Grease paper, said
the foreigners, was everywhere as the madrassa students
removed new weapons from their wrappings.'
In Kandahar, the Taliban seized military vehicles and aircraft,
including MiG-21 fighter planes (though many in disrepair),
helicopters and tanks.20". These spoils of war, however, may not
have come legitimately either. When the Taliban forces reached
195. See infra notes 196-215 and accompanying text.
196. See Davis, supra note 6, at 45-46.
197. See id. at 46; Rashid, supra note 7, at 81.
198. See Davis, supra note 6, at 46.
199. Id. Davis quoted one Pakistani intelligence officer as saying that the dump 'was a
huge dump, a central dump with rockets, artillery ammunition, tank ammunition, and small
arms-both captured from the (pre-1992) Afghan government and Western supplied ammo.
I believe they have sufficient stocks to run their affairs for quite some time. For years even."
Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Rashid, supra notq 7, at81.
203. Davis, supra note 6, at 50 (footnote omitted); see also RUBIN, supra note 6, at 139
(stating that Taliban soldiers "streamed across the [Afghanistan-Pakistan border armed with
new weapons").
204. Davis, supra note 6, at 48.
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Kandahar, a large section of President Rabbani's army did not fight
back.' 5 Later, the Rabbani government accused the Corp com-
mander, Mullah Naqib, of accepting a bribe "from either the
Pakistanis or Taliban emissaries on the understanding that after
the Taliban takeover he would be permitted [to] retain his
position."2
Regardless of how the Taliban obtained its equipment, it is
doubtful that they taught themselves how to use it. Military
training had to come from someone, and it is highly unlikely that
members of the Taliban learned to use complex weapons or pilot
aircraft on their own.2" 7 Although the Taliban's military training
allegedly began in the Pakistani madrassas, after the Taliban
conquered Spin Boldak and Kandahar it set up training camps there
as well.' The military instructors were either Pakistani army
officers or former Afghan officers who fought with or against the
communist regime.2°  These officers are also believed to have
operated much of the sophisticated equipment themselves.210 The
fact that the Taliban received direct assistance from the Pakistani
military was confirmed by the capture of Pakistani soldiers, officers
and other personnel by the Taliban's opposition.2 n
After its initial victories, the Taliban began to face effective
resistance from President Rabbani and his armies.212 Any setbacks
the Taliban faced, however, were met with more assistance from
Pakistan.213 Some reports indicate that Pakistan sent aircraft
technicians to repair the MiG-21 fighter planes captured at
Kandahar, as well as additional military vehicles and equipment.21 '
Pakistan also reportedly provided the Taliban with sophisticated
205. Id.; see also RUBIN, supra note 6, at 139 (stating that the Taliban captured (K] andahar
"with little resistance").
206. Davis, supra note 6, at 49.
207. Id. at 54-55, 68-70.
208. Id. "
209. Id. at 54-55; Rashid, supra note 7, at 86-87.
210. Davis, supra note 6, at 54-55; Rashid, supra note 7, at 86-87.
211. Saikal, supra note 2, at 39.
212. Davis, supra note 6, at 56-59.
213. Id. at 61-63.
214. Davis, supra note 6, at 60-61; Rashid, supra note 7, at 85. Davis summed up
Pakistan's aid to the Taliban as follows:
Logistically, aid has involved expediting supplies of motor and aviation fuel,
ammunition, spare parts and new vehicles to the Taliban. Given the scale and
scope of Taliban operations it is ridiculous to suggest that such supplies are
carried across obscure desert and mountain trails on the backs of donkeys: They
are trucked down a few highways and secondary roads in convoys with the full
concurrence of border authorities.
Davis, supra note 6, at 69.
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communications equipment, including a telephone network in
Kandahar-courtesy of Pakistan Telecom-and an internal wireless
network for use in military operations.215
With Afghanistan as an ally, Pakistan had much to gain in
terms of security and economic benefits. This alliance would
facilitate the creation of trading routes to the newly formed Central
Asia republics21 and provide a buffer between Pakistan and its
enemy Iran.217 The main economic benefit the Afghanistan territory
promised, hpwever, was its potential for accommodating new oil and
gas pipelines that would circumvent Iran.218
This opportunity also garnered support from Saudi Arabia, as
well as from the United States during the Taliban's initial stages of
organization. 219 The American corporation UNOCAL, along with
Saudi oil companies, sought to cultivate a relationship with the
Taliban in order to construct a billion-dollar pipeline through
Afghanistan territory.22 ° UNOCAL's lobbying in the United States,
however, met with a cold reception from women's rights groups and
the Clinton administration after Kabul fell and the Taliban's
misogynistic agenda was enacted. 221 But the Taliban's treatment of
women did not stop Saudi Arabia from extending diplomatic
recognition to the Taliban,222 which is not surprising considering its
own record of sexism and human rights abuses.'
Several sources report that Saudi Arabia was the principal
financial supporter of the Taliban's operation.22 Pakistan actively
lobbied for Saudi support, as evidenced by frequent meetings
between leaders of both countries during the Taliban's rise' to
215. Rashid, supra note 7, at 85.
216. See Mackenzie, supra note 27, at 96.
217. See Rashid, supra note 7, at 86.
218. Mackenzie, supra note 27, at 96.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 97. Mackenzie notes that, until Madeleine Albright replaced Warren
Christopher as Secretary of State in early 1997, the State Department turned a blind eye to
the plight of Afghan women. Id. The Feminist Majority Foundation and other women's rights
groups were instrumental in stalling UNOCAL's plans. Stop Gender Apartheid, supra note
19.
222. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
223. See Yamani, supra note 99, at 270-77. According to Freedom House's annual survey,
both Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan are among the thirteen countries receiving the lowest
rating for political rights and civil liberties. See Adrian Karatnycky, The 1999-2000 Freedom
House Survey of Freedom: A Century of Progress, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL
SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: 1999-2000, at 5, 7 (Adrian Karatnycky ed.,
2000).
224. See Maley, supra note 8, at 16; Rashid, supra note 7, at 76; Telesetsky, supra note 17,
at 294; Stop Gender Apartheid, supra note 19.
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power.2" A Pakistani official facilitated contacts between Taliban
leaders and Arab princes by organizing hunting trips to Kandahar
in 1995."2 The Saudis arrived "on huge transport planes bringing
dozens of luxury jeeps, many of which they left behind for their
Taliban hosts."227
The alleged contributions of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to the
Taliban militia clearly violate the international law against
intervention and use of force. By finding the United States liable for
its military support to the Contras, Nicaragua v. United States
demonstrated that the use of force encompasses activities such as
providing military supplies, training and other means of support to
a group that uses that support for its own acts of aggression.
Evidence shows that Pakistan served as a base for the organization
of the Taliban, beginning in its madrassas, and that both Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia maintained the Taliban's offensive through
multiple forms of financial and military aid.' Assuming this
evidence is accurate, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia gave the Taliban
the means to conquer Afghanistan. Just as the United States
violated Nicaragua's self-determination by supporting the Contra
Rebels,' Pakistan and Saudi Arabia violated Afghanistan's self-
determination by supporting the Taliban.
Although Pakistan and Saudi Arabia's contributions to the
Taliban's military offensive are analogous to those condemned in
the Nicaragua decision, this Note concedes that there is not
sufficient evidence to hold that those countries met the threshold of
"control" articulated by the ICJ necessary to hold them liable for the
Taliban's human rights violations under international law.' This
Note, however, argues that the illegal actions of Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia provide a legal basis for the restoration of Afghanistan's
right to self-determination through UN enforcement mechanisms."
Ultimately, this Note argues that the right of self-determination can
no longer be separated from human rights. 2
225. See Rashid, supra note 7, at 76.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 192-215 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text. At the same time, this Note agrees
with the criticisms of that standard articulated supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 128.
232. Cf McCorquodale, supra note 31, at 865 ("[A] State's internal protection of the right
of self-determination is now of international concern, which is consistent with the
development of international human rights law so that human rights are now a matter not
within a State's domestic jurisdiction.").
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CONCLUSION
In 1999, the UN Special Rapporteur for Violence Against
Women declared the Taliban regime to be "the most misogynist
entity in the world."' This is not surprising given the Talbian's
gross violations of Afghan women's rights.' Unfortunately,
international actors have been reluctant to enforce women's rights,
often citing state's rights to sovereignty and freedom from foreign
interference.' This freedom rests in the international principle of
self-determination of states.2
At the same time, the principle of self-determination has grown
to encompass, in the eyes of many, the self-determination of
people. s7 As the valuation of human rights and democratic process
has increased in the international realm,' this expansion of the
right of self-determination is logical and necessary. In recognizing
the Taliban as a product of foreign interference and, therefore, a
violation of Afghanistan's self-determination as a state,2 39 the
Taliban's flagrant violation of the Afghan people's right to self-
determination cannot be ignored. Recognizing their right, and the
right of Afghan women in particular, can only have a positive
impact on self-determination jurisprudence, and consequently, the
rights of men and women around the world.
According to its Charter, the United Nations has the right to
counter-intervene in order to protect the people of Afghanistan.m
Given the brutality of the Taliban regime, it is hard to imagine a
population more in need of such protection. Furthermore, the
United Nations should use this opportunity to facilitate the
development of Afghanistan's first democratic government, and the
right to self-determination of all its citizens-male and female. The
plain language of the UN Charter, as well as other international
declarations, allows for such enforcement. 1 If these words are to
have any meaning, the UN must condemn the illegal actions of
233. Country Reports: Afghanistan, supra note 110, at 41.
234. See supra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
235. See TES6N, supra note 31, at 162; see also Craig R. Whitney, Hands Off The No Man's
Land in the Fight for Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, at 4-1 (discussing the
reluctance to protect human rights in general under the same rationale).
236. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 31, 34, 139-40 and accompanying text.
238. See Donoho, supra note 140, at 367-68.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
240. See supra notes 127, 130 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
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Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and restore the rights of Afghanistan's
women.
SHANNON A. WILEY
